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We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an inter-
val of the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses a
probability distribution over the interval for each preference prole. We in-
vestigate strategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions are
compared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a \minimally
rich domain", we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized median
rules (Ehlers et al., 2002, Journal of Economic Theory 105: 408-434) by
means of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next,
we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence of
sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer
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1 Introduction
We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an interval of the real
line among a group of agents. Each agent has ordinal preferences over the chosen
level of the public good. We examine this problem in a probabilistic framework to
achieve a \fair" solution. Consider a situation where a group of agents try to choose
one of two public projects, a and b. Assume that half of them prefer a to b, while
the other half prefer b to a. In this case, one of the fair solutions to this problem
would be to use a lottery between the two projects.1 A probabilistic rule, or simply a
rule, chooses a probability distribution over the interval for each preference prole.2
Since preferences are dened over deterministic alternatives and the probabilis-
tic rule selects the probability distribution, we need to explain how agents evaluate
distributions. In this paper, we assume that each agent compares probability distri-
butions based on (rst order) stochastic dominance relation derived from his ordinal
preference. That is, for each preference of the agent, and each pair of probability
distributions, say f and g, f stochastically dominates g according to his preference
if to each upper contour set of the preference, f assigns a probability at least as
high as the probability assigned under g. This is equivalent to assuming that for
each von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that represents the agent's ordinal
preference, the expected utility under the distribution f is at least as high as the
expected utility under g.
Preferences are usually private information. Agents may strategically misrep-
resent their preferences to obtain the outcome distributions they prefer. As a re-
sult, the chosen outcome may not be socially desirable relative to the agents' true
preferences. The property called stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness is of-
ten imposed for a probabilistic rule to give agents the incentive to represent their
preferences truthfully. It requires that for each agent, truth-telling stochastically
dominates lying.
It is well-known that there is no sd-strategy-proof and ex-post ecient proba-
bilistic rule, dened on the unrestricted domain, other than the random dictatorship
rules when there are at least three alternatives (Gibbard, 1977). However, if the
domain is restricted to the class of \single-peaked" preferences, Ehlers et al. (2002)
show that there are sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules other than random dicta-
torships.3 A preference is single-peaked if there is a unique best alternative, called
the peak, such that its welfare monotonically decreases around the peak. On the
single-peaked domain, they also characterize the class of the so-called probabilistic
generalized median rules by means of sd-strategy-proofness and unanimity.4 Thus,
1Ehlers and Klaus (2001) and Ehlers et al. (2002) also consider a probabilistic approach to
improve \a priori fairness".
2Note that the probabilistic rules studied in this paper rely on only ordinal preferences of
agents. This approach is usual in the context of voting problems with lotteries. For example, see
Gibbard (1977) and Barbera (1979a,b).
3On the other hand, when the set of alternatives is a convex subset of multi-dimensional Eu-
clidean space, Dutta et al. (2002) show that, on the domain of all strictly convex and single-peaked
preferences, a rule is sd-strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is a random dictatorship.
4Ehlers and Klaus (2001) examine the one-dimensional voting problem from the perspective of
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they extend the results of Moulin (1980)5 to the probabilistic model. In this paper,
following the results of Ehlers et al. (2002), we examine the following two questions
on the domain conditions of sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules.
The rst question is how much we can restrict the domain on which the proba-
bilistic generalized median rules are the unique class of sd-strategy-proof and onto
rules. If a rule is sd-strategy-proof on a domain, then it is also sd-strategy-proof
on any subdomain. Thus, the smaller the domain, the weaker the requirement of
sd-strategy-proofness. In this paper, a \minimally rich domain" is dened as a small
subset of the single-peaked domain satisfying the following two conditions: (1) for
each alternative, there is \only one" preference whose peak is equal to the alterna-
tive, and (2) given three distinct alternatives, say x; y, and z with x < z < y, there
is a nite sequence of preferences whose peaks monotonically increase from x to z
(respectively, decrease from y to z) such that for each preference in the sequence,
the previous peak point is preferred to y (respectively, x). The \symmetric single-
peaked domain"6 is an example of the minimally rich domain. We establish that
the probabilistic generalized median rules are the unique class of sd-strategy-proof
and onto rules on a minimally rich domain.
The second question is how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the
existence of sd-strategy-proof and onto probabilistic rules. Note that the random
dictatorship rules are sd-strategy-proof and onto on the universal domain. Thus, to
rule out such trivial rules, we additionally impose the no-vetoer condition. Agent i is
a vetoer for a rule if the alternative that is best for all agents other than i, and worst
for i, is never chosen with probability one. The no-vetoer condition requires that a
rule should have no vetoer. We establish that the domain of \convex" preferences
is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for the existence
of probabilistic rules that satisfy sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer
condition.
Our results are closely related to those of Berga and Serizawa (2000). For the
deterministic case, they characterize the class of generalized median rules by means
of strategy-proofness and ontoness on a BS-minimally rich domain,7 and show that
the convex domain is the unique maximal domain including a BS-minimally rich
domain for strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the BS-no-vetoer condition.8 Under
sd-strategy-proofness, the BS-no-vetoer condition implies the no-vetoer condition.
a solidarity property on the single-peaked domain.
5See also Ching (1997) for a detailed analysis of the deterministic model.
6A preference is symmetric single-peaked if there is a unique peak, and its utility representation
is symmetric around the peak.
7Berga-Serizawa (BS)-minimally rich domain is a small subset of the single-peaked domain
satisfying the following two conditions: (a) for each alternative, there is only one preference whose
peak is equal to the alternative, and (b) given two distinct alternatives, say x and y, there is a
preference whose peak is between x and y such that x is preferred to y. Condition (a) is the
same as condition (1) of our minimally rich domain. Condition (b) is weaker than condition (2)
proposed in this paper.
8The BS-no-vetoer condition requires that for each agent, each preference of the agent, and
each alternative, there is a preference prole of the other agents at which the alternative is chosen
with probability one.
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Thus, our results can be interpreted as an extension of those of Berga and Serizawa
(2000) to the probabilistic model.
For the deterministic model, several papers examine the maximal domain for
the existence of strategy-proof rules. Many authors such as Barbera et al. (1991,
1999), Serizawa (1995), and Berga (2002) investigate the maximal domain on which
the generalized median rules are strategy-proof. Their analyses exclude rules other
than the generalized median rules. On the other hand, Berga and Serizawa (2000)
do not restrict the rules a priori, but obtain the maximal domain by only imposing
properties on rules. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to examine
the maximal domain of sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules. Further, we do not
restrict the rules a priori, and establish the maximal domain result for properties
on rules. Recently, Hatsumi et al. (2011) examine the maximal domain for the
deterministic model with multiple public goods. They establish that the domain
of separable preferences is a maximal domain for strategy-proofness and the BS-
no-vetoer condition. For the allotment problem, Mizobuchi and Serizawa (2006)
investigate the two questions that are parallel to Berga and Serizawa (2000) and
our paper.
As we mentioned above, since the symmetric single-peaked domain is minimally
rich, we also obtain the counterpart of the result of Border and Jordan (1983)9 for
the probabilistic case as a corollary of our result.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and
denitions. Section 3 explains the main results. Section 4 provides the concluding
remarks. Section 5 is devoted to the proofs of the results in Section 3.
2 The model and denitions
Let N  f1; : : : ; ng be a set of agents. Assume that 2  n < 1. The set of
alternatives is a closed interval Z  [z; z] on the real line R.10 A preference is a
complete and transitive binary relation Ri on Z. Let Pi be the strict preference
relation associated with Ri, and Ii the indierence relation. Given a preference Ri
and z 2 Z, the upper contour set of Ri at z is the set U(Ri; z)  fy 2 Z : y Ri
zg, and the lower contour set of Ri at z is the set L(Ri; z)  fy 2 Z : z Ri yg.
A preference Ri is continuous if for each z 2 Z, U(Ri; z) and L(Ri; z) are closed.
Given a preference Ri, let p(Ri)  fx 2 Z : for each y 2 Z; x Ri yg be the
set of the most preferred alternatives according to Ri. We call p(Ri) the peak of
Ri. Let P denote the set of continuous preference relations on Z. A domain is
a subset R of P . A preference prole is a list R  (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 RN . Let
R i  (Rj)j2Nnfig be a list of preferences for all agents except for agent i. We write
the prole (R1; : : : ; Ri 1; Ri; Ri+1; : : : ; Rn) as ( Ri; R i).
A preference Ri on Z is convex if for each z 2 Z, the set U(Ri; z) is convex.
9For the deterministic case, they establish that on the symmetric single-peaked domain, the
generalized median rules are the unique class of strategy-proof and onto rules.
10Given a; b 2 R, [a; b], ]a; b[ , [a; b[ , and ]a; b] denote the closed, open, right half open, and left
half open intervals with endpoints a and b, respectively.
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Let Rvex  P be the domain of convex preferences. A preference Ri on Z is single-
peaked if p(Ri) is a singleton, and for each pair z; z
0 2 Z, whenever z < z0  p(Ri)
or p(Ri)  z0 < z, then z0 Pi z. Let Rsin  P be the domain of single-peaked
preferences. A preference Ri on Z is symmetric single-peaked if p(Ri) is a
singleton, and for each pair z; z0 2 Z, (z   p(Ri))2 > (z0   p(Ri))2 if and only if
z0 Pi z. Let Rsym  P be the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. Note
that Rsym ( Rsin ( Rvex.
Let (Z) be the set of probability distributions over Z.11 A probabilistic rule
f is a function from RN to (Z). Throughout the paper, we simply refer to a
probabilistic rule as rule. Given a subset X of Z, f(R)(X) is the probability that
the chosen alternative belongs to X. We will also need to refer to rules that select
degenerate distributions, that is, probability distributions that put weight one on a
single alternative. A deterministic rule F is a function from RN to Z.
Since preferences are dened over deterministic alternatives and the rule selects
probability distribution, we need to explain how agents evaluate distributions. Let
Ri 2 R. The (rst order) stochastic dominance relation (sd) associated with Ri is
dened as follows. For each pair Q, Q0 2 (Z), Q stochastically dominates Q0
at Ri if for each z 2 Z, Q(U(Ri; z))  Q0(U(Ri; z)), We write this as Q Rsdi Q0.
Also, Q strictly stochastically dominates Q0 at Ri if Q Rsdi Q
0, and for some
y 2 Z, Q(U(Ri; y)) > Q0(U(Ri; y)). We write this as Q P sdi Q0.
Next, we introduce the axioms. Let f be a rule on RN . Following the terminol-
ogy given by Thomson (2010), we use the prex \sd" in naming the axioms based
on stochastic dominance relations. The next two axioms are related to incentive
compatibility. First, for each agent, truth-telling stochastically dominates lying.
Sd-strategy-proofness: For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , and each R^i 2 R,
f(R) Rsdi f(R^i; R i).
Second, by misrepresenting his preferences, no agent can ever obtain a distribu-
tion that strictly stochastically dominates truth-telling.
Weak sd-strategy-proofness: For each R 2 RN , and each i 2 N , there is no
R^i 2 R such that f(R^i; R i) P sdi f(R).
The next three axioms are related to eciency. A distribution Q 2 (Z) is
sd-ecient for R 2 RN if there is no Q0 2 (Z) such that for each i 2 N ,
Q0 Rsdi Q, and for some j 2 N , Q0 P sdj Q.
Sd-eciency:12 For each R 2 RN , f(R) is sd-ecient for R.
Second, if there are alternatives that all agents agree as the best, then these
alternatives should be chosen with probability 1.
Unanimity: For each R 2 RN such that Ti2N p(Ri) 6= ;, f(R)(Ti2N p(Ri)) = 1.
11We consider probability distributions dened on the Borel -algebra L on Z. See the Appendix
in Ehlers et al. (2002) for the formal denition. Throughout the paper, we assume that each subset
X of Z belongs to L. Also, we often refer to several denitions and results found in Ehlers et al.
(2002).
12This notion is also referred to as ordinal eciency.
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Third, for each alternative, there is a preference prole at which the alternative
is chosen with probability 1.
Ontoness: For each z 2 Z, there is R 2 RN such that f(R)(fzg) = 1.
Note that sd-eciency implies unanimity, which implies ontoness.
The next three properties pertain to how a rule distributes power across agents.
Agent i 2 N is a dictator for a rule if the outcome is always chosen from this agent's
best alternatives. Non-dictatorship requires that a rule should have no dictator.
Non-dictatorship: For each i 2 N , there is R 2 RN such that f(R)(p(Ri)) 6= 1.
Agent i 2 N is a vetoer for a rule if the alternative that is best for all agents
other than i, and worst for i, is never chosen with probability 1. The no-vetoer
condition requires that a rule should have no vetoer.
No-vetoer condition: For each i 2 N , each x 2 Z, and each R 2 RN , if for each
j 2 N n fig, fxg = p(Rj), and for each z 2 Z, z Ri x, then f(R)(fxg) = 1.
Note that the no-vetoer condition implies non-dictatorship. The following re-
lated condition is imposed in Berga and Serizawa (2000).
BS-no-vetoer condition: For each i 2 N , each x 2 Z, and each Ri 2 R, there is
R i 2 RNnfig such that f(R)(fxg) = 1.
Note that under sd-strategy-proofness, the BS-no-vetoer condition implies the
no-vetoer condition.13
The next property says that a rule only depends on the prole of peaks.
Peak-onlyness: For each pair R; R^ 2 RN , if for each i 2 N , p(Ri) = p(R^i), then
f(R) = f(R^).
Next is the class of rules introduced by Ehlers et al. (2002). It is central to our
paper as well. The rules are described in the following way. Let D  (DS)S22N be a
collection of probability distributions such that (i) D;(fzg) = 1, (ii) DN(fzg) = 1,
and (iii) for each S; T 2 2N , and each x 2 Z, DS[T ([z; x])   DS([z; x[)  0. A
unique rule is associated to each collection. We therefore refer to the collection as
the \signature" of the rule. Let  be the set of signatures. As we will see, these
distributions are the choices made by the rule for proles of extremists. A step in
the proof consists in identifying the collection. We refer to this step as a calibration
step.14
13To see this, let f be a rule satisfying sd-strategy-proofness and BS-no-vetoer condition on
RN . Let i 2 N , x 2 Z, and R 2 RN be such that for each j 2 N n fig, fxg = p(Rj),
and for each z 2 Z, z Ri x. Then, by BS-no-vetoer condition, there is R^ i 2 RNnfig
such that f(Ri; R^ i)(fxg) = 1. Without loss of generality, let i = 1. By sd-strategy-
proofness, f(R1; R2; R^ 1;2)(fxg) = f(R1; R2; R^ 1;2)(U(R2; x))  f(R1; R^ 1)(U(R2; x)) =
f(R1; R^ 1)(fxg) = 1. Also, by sd-strategy-proofness, f(R1; R2;3; R^ 1;2;3)(fxg) =
f(R1; R2;3; R^ 1;2;3)(U(R3; x))  f(R1; R2; R^ 1;2)(U(R3; x)) = f(R1; R2; R^ 1;2)(fxg) = 1. Re-
peating this argument for agents j = 4; : : : ; n, we have f(R)(fxg) = 1.
14This terminology was introduced by Thomson (1999).
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Given R 2 RN , let n(R) be the number of dierent peaks at R,15 and for each
` 2 f1; : : : ; ng, let p`(R) be the `-th smallest peak at R, and let S`  fi 2 N :
p(Ri)  p`(R)g, S0  ;, p0(R)  z, and pn+1(R)  z.
We now dene the class of rules.
Probabilistic generalized median rule with signature D 2 , gmD:16 For











where 1X is the indicator function 1X : Z ! f0; 1g such that if z 2 X, 1X(z) = 1,
and otherwise, 1X(z) = 0.
17
The following is a description of the probabilistic generalized median rule with
signature D 2 , gmD. The distribution chosen by gmD coincides with the dis-
tribution D; on the interval [z; p1(R)[, with DN on the interval ]pn(R); z], and for
each ` 2 f1; : : : ; n  1g, with DS` on the interval ]p`(R); p`+1(R)[. Further, for each





Ehlers et al. (2002) characterize the class of sd-strategy-proof and onto rules on
the domain of single-peaked preferences.
Theorem (Ehlers et al., 2002). A rule dened on the domain of single-peaked
preferences is sd-strategy-proof and onto if and only if it is a probabilistic generalized
median rule.18
This section shows that their results still hold on more restricted domains. We
establish it on a \minimally rich" domain dened as follows. For each pair x; y 2 Z
with x 6= y, let R(y; x)  fRi 2 R : x Pi y and minfx; yg < p(Ri) < maxfx; ygg.
15We simply use n when we can omit R as an argument without confusion.
16We follow the terminology given by Thomson (2010). In Ehlers et al. (2002), this class of
rules is referred to as \xed-probabilistic-ballots rules".
17Since a probabilistic generalized median rule gmD is peak-only, we can denote gmD(R) by
gmD(p(Ri)i2N ) as a function of the prole of peaks.
18More precisely, unanimity is imposed in their paper instead of ontoness. Note that on the
single-peaked preference domain, under sd-strategy-proofness, unanimity coincides with ontoness
(See Fact 5 in the Appendix). They also characterize the class of sd-strategy-proof and peak-
only rules on the single-peaked domain. This class of rules is slightly larger than the class of
probabilistic generalized median rules.
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Denition 1. A domain R  P is minimally rich if
(i) R is a subclass of the domain Rsin of single-peaked preferences,
(ii) for each z 2 Z, there is a unique preference R0 2 R such that p(R0) = z, and
(iii) for each triple x; y; z 2 Z with x 6= y and minfx; yg < z < maxfx; yg, there
exist a nite K 2 N and a sequence R(k)0 	Kk=1 of preferences in R such that19
(iii-a) R
(1)
0 2 R(y; x),














	  z  maxp(R(K 1)0 ); p(R(K)0 )	, and z 6= p(R(K 1)0 ).
Conditions (i) and (ii) say that, for each alternative, there is only one single-
peaked preference whose peak is equal to the alternative. Condition (iii) says that,
given three distinct alternatives, say x; y; and z with minfx; yg < z < maxfx; yg,







of preferences satisfying the following three
conditions: (iii-a) the peak of R
(1)
0 is between x and y, and x is preferred to y under
R
(1)
0 , (iii-b) for each k 2 f2; : : : ; Kg, the peak of R(k)0 is between p(R(k 1)0 ) and y,
and p(R
(k 1)
0 ) is preferred to y under R
(k)






The following related condition is imposed in Berga and Serizawa (2000).
Denition 2. A domain R  P is BS-minimally rich if
(BS-i) R is a subclass of the domain Rsin of single-peaked preferences,
(BS-ii) for each z 2 Z, there is a unique preference R0 2 R such that p(R0) = z,
and
(BS-iii) for each pair x; y 2 Z with x 6= y, there is a preference R0 2 R(y; x).
Conditions (i) and (ii) of our minimally rich domain are equivalent to conditions
(BS-i) and (BS-ii), respectively. Condition (BS-iii) is weaker than condition (iii)
of our minimally rich domain. Thus, any minimally rich domain is BS-minimally
rich.20
The following are examples of minimally rich domains:
(1) Domain Rsym of symmetric single-peaked preferences,
(2) Domain Ra  Rsin of preferences such that for each z 2 Z, there is a unique
preference R0 2 Ra with p(R0) = z such that for each pair x; y 2 Z with x < z < y,
x I0 y if and only if (x  z)2 = 2(y   z)2,
(3) Domain Rb  Rsin of preferences such that for each z 2 Z, there is a unique
preference R0 2 Rb with p(R0) = z such that for each pair x; y 2 Z with x < z < y,
x I0 y if and only if (x  z)2 = t(z)(y   z)2, where t is an increasing function from
Z to [1; 2].21
Let RMR be the class of minimally rich domains.
19N denotes the set of natural numbers.
20It is an open question whether the converse implication holds or not. Thus, there could be a
domain that is BS-minimally rich, but not minimally rich. However, note that our minimally rich
domains still cover many important domains in their applications.
21A function t is increasing if for each pair z; z0 2 Z with z  z0, t(z)  t(z0).
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A minimally rich domain is much smaller than the single-peaked domain. By
the denition of sd-strategy-proofness, if a rule is sd-strategy-proof on a domain,
then it is sd-strategy-proof on any subdomain. Thus, sd-strategy-proofness on a
minimally rich domain is weaker than sd-strategy-proofness on the single-peaked
domain. Hence, on a minimally rich domain, potentially, there exist more rules
that are sd-strategy-proof and onto. However, our rst result, presented below, says
that the probabilistic generalized median rules are still the unique class of rules
satisfying these two properties.
Theorem 1. A rule dened on a minimally rich domain is sd-strategy-proof and
onto if and only if it is a probabilistic generalized median rule.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the Appendix. For the deterministic model,
Berga and Serizawa (2000) characterize the generalized median rules22 by strategy-
proofness and ontoness on a BS-minimally rich domain. Our result can be inter-
preted as a counterpart of theirs for the probabilistic model.
As we mentioned above, the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences is
minimally rich. Thus, we obtain the following corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. A rule dened on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences
is sd-strategy-proof and onto if and only if it is a probabilistic generalized median
rule.
For the deterministic model, Border and Jordan (1983) characterize the gen-
eralized median rules by strategy-proofness and ontoness on the symmetric single-
peaked domain. Corollary 1 is an extension of their result to the probabilistic
model.
3.2. Maximal domain
Next, we ask how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence
of sd-strategy-proof rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer condition. The
denition of a maximal domain is as follows.
Denition 3. A domain R  P is maximal for a list of properties if
(i) there is a rule on R satisfying the properties, and
(ii) for each domain R^ with R  R^  P , no rule on R^ satises the same properties.
Note that a maximal domain for a list of properties may not be unique. We
consider domains that include a minimally rich domain.
22The generalized median rules are dened as follows. Let a  (aS)S22N be a collection of points
in Z such that (i) a; = z, (ii) aN = z, and (iii) for each S; T 2 2N , aS[T  aS . This collection is
the signature of the deterministic rule. Let A be the set of signatures.
Generalized median rule with signature a 2 A, GMa: for each R 2 RN , GMa(R) =
minSNfmaxfp(Ri)i2S ; aSgg.
Let D  (DS)S22N 2  be such that for each S 2 2N , DS is a degenerate distribution. Let
a  (aS)S22N be such that for each S 2 2N , aS is the point at which DS places probability
one. Then, the probabilistic generalized median rules gmD with signature D coincides with the
generalized median rule GMa with signature a  (aS)S22N .
In Berga and Serizawa (2000), this class is referred to as \generalized median voter schemes".
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Theorem 2. Assume that there are at least three agents, and let R 2 RMR. The
domain of convex preferences is the unique maximal domain including R for sd-
strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer condition.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in the Appendix.
Remark 1. Assume that there are only two agents. No rule dened on a minimally
rich domain satises sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer condition.23
Thus, in Theorem 2, we require that there be at least three agents.
Remark 2. Note that the random dictatorship rules24 satisfy sd-strategy-proofness
and ontoness on the universal domain, but not the no-vetoer condition. Thus, in
order to rule out such trivial rules, we impose the no-vetoer condition in Theorem 2.
We remark that this condition also excludes some rules other than the random dic-
tatorship rules. Furthermore, if we do not impose the no-vetoer condition, there are
sd-strategy-proof and onto rules other than the random dictatorships on domains
that include non-convex preferences. Thus, the no-vetoer condition is crucial to
obtain convex preferences as a maximal domain. Example 1 below illustrates that,
on a domain that include non-convex preferences, there is a non-random dictator-
ship rule that satises sd-strategy-proofness and ontoness, but not the no-vetoer
condition.25
Example 1. A preferenceRi is outside convex if there are two intervals [a
 (Ri); a+(Ri)]
and [b (Ri); b+(Ri)] of Z such that (1) a+(Ri)  b (Ri), (2) p(Ri)  [a (Ri); a+(Ri)][
[b (Ri); b+(Ri)], and (3) for each X 2 f[z; a+(Ri)]; [b (Ri); z]g and each z 2 X,
U(Ri; z) \ X is convex. Let Rovex be the domain of outside convex preferences.
Note that the domain Rovex includes non-convex preferences and minimally rich
domains. Let f^ : (Rovex)N ! (Z) be the rule such that for each R 2 R^N , and











Then, f^ is sd-strategy-proof and onto, but violates the no-vetoer condition. However,
it is not the random dictatorship rules.
For the deterministic model, Berga and Serizawa (2000) prove that the convex
domain is the unique maximal domain including a BS-minimally rich domain for
23To see this, suppose that there is a rule f on R 2 RMR satisfying these three properties.
Let N  f1; 2g. Let R1 2 R be such that p(R1) < z, and for each z 2 Z, z R1 z. Let
R2 2 R be such that p(R2)  z. Then, by the no-vetoer condition, f(R)(fzg) = 1. Let R^1 2 R
be such that p(R^1)  z. Then, by uncompromisingness (see Proposition 1 in Subsection 3.3),
f(R^1; R2)(fzg) = 1. Thus, f(R^1; R2)(fzg) 6= 1. This contradicts the no-vetoer condition.
24Let W be the set of weights w such that w  (w1; : : : ; wn) 2 [0; 1]N and
P
i2N wi = 1.





25For the deterministic model, similar arguments are found in Berga and Serizawa (2000).
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strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the BS-no-vetoer condition. For the probabilistic
model, it is easy to check if there is a rule that satisfy these three properties on the
convex domain. Furthermore, the BS-no-vetoer condition together with sd-strategy-
proofness implies the no-vetoer condition. Thus, as a corollary of Theorem 2, we
obtain a counterpart of their result for the probabilistic case.
Corollary 2. Assume that there are at least three agents. The domain of convex
preferences is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for
sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the BS-no-vetoer condition.
Since each minimally rich domain is a subclass of the single-peaked domain,
each domain that includes the single-peaked domain also includes a minimally rich
domain. Thus, the class of domains that include the single-peaked domain is a
subclass of the class of domains that include a minimally rich domain. We obtain
the following as a corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 3. Assume that there are at least three agents. The domain of convex
preferences is the unique maximal domain including the single-peaked domain for
sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer condition.
Since the symmetric single-peaked domain is a minimally rich domain, we also
obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4. Assume that there are at least three agents. The domain of convex
preferences is the unique maximal domain including the symmetric single-peaked
domain for sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer condition.
Remark 3. A deterministic alternative can be regarded as a degenerate probability
distribution. Also, each of the properties introduced in our paper, when imposed on
deterministic rules, reduces to the property of the same name for the deterministic
model. Thus, as a byproduct of our results, for the deterministic model, we also
obtain results that are close to the results of Berga and Serizawa (2000).
3.3. Technical discussions: uncompromisingness and richness of domains
We now discuss some key points of our results and proofs. First, we introduce
a property that plays an important role in the proof of the uniqueness part of
Theorem 1. This notion was rst introduced by Ehlers et al. (2002): when an
agent's preference changes, the chosen distribution does not change outside the
interval whose endpoints are his initial peak and new peak.26
Given Ri; R^i 2 R, let E(Ri; R^i)  [minfp(Ri); p(R^i)g;maxfp(Ri); p(R^i)g].
Uncompromisingness: For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , each R^i 2 R, and each
X  Z such that X \ E(Ri; R^i) = ;, f(R)(X) = f(R^i; R i)(X).
The next proposition is key to Theorem 1.
Proposition 1. On a minimally rich domain, sd-strategy-proofness and ontoness
imply uncompromisingness.
26This property is an extension to the probabilistic model of a property introduced for the
deterministic model by Border and Jordan (1983).
11
The proof is in the Appendix. Ehlers et al. (2002) establish that on the
single-peaked domain, sd-strategy-proofness and peak-onlyness imply uncompromis-
ingness.27 Note that, by the denition of a minimally rich domain, any rule dened
on a minimally rich domain is peak-only. Thus, the assumption of our Proposition 1
is stronger than theirs. However, we cannot directly apply their result and proof
techniques to prove Proposition 1. As we explain below, there is a crucial dierence
between the single-peaked domain and a minimally rich domain.
We now introduce a new property of rules. This property is implied by uncom-
promisingness. Hereafter, we only focus on this property to simplify our subsequent
argument.
Invariance property: For each R 2 RN , each i 2 N , each R^i 2 R, and each pair
a; b 2 Z such that a < p(Ri) < p(R^i) < b, f(R)([a; b]) = f(R^i; R i)([a; b]).
Next, we introduce another richness condition on a domain. A domain R  P is
rich if for each Ri 2 R, and each pair a; b 2 Z with a < p(Ri) < b, there is R0i 2 R
such that (i) p(Ri) = p(R
0
i), and (ii) U(R
0
i; b) = [a; b]. Note that the single-peaked
domain is rich. Under this richness condition, we can directly apply the proof
techniques developed by Ehlers et al. (2002) to obtain the invariance property, as
shown in the following fact.
Fact 1. Let R  Rsin be a rich domain. If a rule f on RN is sd-strategy-proof
and peak-only, then it satises the invariance property.
Proof.28 Let R 2 RN , i 2 N , R^i 2 R, and a; b 2 Z be such that a < p(Ri) <
p(R^i) < b. Since R is rich, there are R0i; Ri 2 R such that (i) p(Ri) = p(R0i),
p(R^i) = p( Ri), and (ii) U(R
0
i; b) = [a; b] = U( Ri; b). Then, by sd-strategy-proofness,
f(R0i; R i)(U(R
0
i; b))  f( Ri; R i)(U(R0i; b)). Similarly, by sd-strategy-proofness,
f(R0i; R i)(U( Ri; b))  f( Ri; R i)(U( Ri; b)). Since U(R0i; b) = [a; b] = U( Ri; b), we
have f(R0i; R i)([a; b]) = f( Ri; R i)([a; b]). Finally, by peak-onlyness, f(R)([a; b]) =
f(R0i; R i)([a; b]) and f(R^i; R i)([a; b]) = f( Ri; R i)([a; b]). Thus, f(R)([a; b]) =
f(R^i; R i)([a; b]). 
On the other hand, since no two distinct preferences have the same peak on
any minimally rich domain, no minimally rich domain is rich. Thus, we cannot
apply the argument used in the proof of Fact 1 to obtain the invariance property
on a minimally rich domain. This is the main dierence between the single-peaked
domain and a minimally rich domain, and the reason the proof techniques of Ehlers
et al. (2002) cannot be applied to prove Proposition 1.
We develop two lemmas to overcome this diculty. These lemmas give us vari-
ants of the invariance property. Lemma 1 says that under sd-strategy-proofness and
ontoness, if a group of agents with the lowest peak, say p1, changes their peaks,
and their new peak point, say p, is still less than the second lowest peak, then the
outcome distribution does not change outside the interval with endpoints p1 and p.
A similar statement applies to a group of agents with the highest peaks.
27See Ehlers et al. (2002, Lemma 3.1). They also establish that peak-onlyness is implied by
sd-strategy-proof and unanimity (see Ehlers et al., 2002, Proposition 5.2).
28Indeed, in this proof, we use the proof techniques developed by Ehlers et al. (2002).
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Lemma 2 says that under sd-strategy-proofness and ontoness, for each point
p 2 Z, if a group of agents whose peaks are less than p changes their peaks to p,
then the outcome distribution does not change outside the interval with endpoints
p1 and p. Also, a similar statement applies to a group of agents whose peaks are
greater than p.
Furthermore, on a minimally rich domain, ontoness is indispensable to obtain
uncompromisingness,29 while it is not required on the single-peaked domain. This
is also one of the dierences between the single-peaked domain and minimally rich
domains.
Since the characterization result of the class of sd-strategy-proof and onto rules
on a minimally rich domain is utilized in the proof of our maximal domain theorem,
proving Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 is also key to Theorem 2.
4 Concluding remarks
We established that, on a minimally rich domain, the probabilistic generalized me-
dian rules are the unique class of sd-strategy-proof and onto rules. Recently, by
using the characterization result of Berga and Serizawa (2000), Masso and Moreno
de Barreda (2011) characterize the class of strategy-proof deterministic rules on the
symmetric single-peaked domain.30 It is an interesting question whether a result
parallel to theirs can be obtained for the probabilistic model.
Next, we examined how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence
of rules that satisfy sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer condition. We
established that the domain of convex preferences is the unique maximal domain
including a minimally rich domain for these properties. For the deterministic model,
Berga and Serizawa (2000) establish that the unique maximal domain including a
BS-minimally rich domain for strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the BS-no-vetoer
condition is the convex domain. Our result can be interpreted as an extension of
theirs to the probabilistic model.
In this paper, we focused on the analysis of the probabilistic rules dened on the
set of ordinal preferences of agents. Another possible formulation of probabilistic
rules is to dene a rule on the set of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions,
and assume that agents compare probability distributions based on their expected
utilities. Note that the notion of sd-strategy-proofness is dierent from that of
strategy-proofness based on the expected utility. To see the dierence between the
two notions of strategy-proofness for probabilistic rules, it is also interesting to
examine the conditions on the domains of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness based
on the expected utility.
29For example, for the deterministic model, strategy-proofness alone does not imply uncompro-
misingness on the symmetric single-peaked domain (Border and Jordan, 1983). Since the class of
probabilistic rules includes deterministic rules as a special case, their example also holds for the
probabilistic model.




Let R 2 RMR, and let R be a domain such that R  R  Rsin. Given Ri 2 R
and z 2 Z, the strict upper contour set of Ri at z is the set SU(Ri; z)
 fy 2 Z : y Pi zg. Fact 2 says that the stochastic dominance relation Rsdi is
equivalent to that dened in terms of strict upper contour sets.
Fact 2 (Ehlers et al., 2002, Lemma 2.1). For each Ri 2 R, and each pair Q,
Q0 2 (Z), Q Rsdi Q0 if and only if for each z 2 Z, Q(SU(Ri; z))  Q0(SU(Ri; z)),
and Q P sdi Q
0 if and only if Q Rsdi Q
0 and for some z 2 Z, Q(SU(Ri; z)) >
Q0(SU(Ri; z)).
Given R 2 RN , let p(R)  mini2Nfp(Ri)g, and p(R)  maxi2Nfp(Ri)g, and let
E(R)  [p(R); p(R)], that is, E(R) is the set of ex-post ecient outcomes for R.
Fact 3 says that sd-eciency is equivalent to ex-post eciency.
Fact 3 (Ehlers et al., 2002, Lemma 2.2). Let f be a rule on RN . Then, f is
sd-ecient if and only if for each R 2 RN , f(R)(E(R)) = 1.
Fact 4 says that sd-strategy-proofness and unanimity imply ex-post eciency.
Fact 4 (Ehlers et al., 2002, Proposition 5.1). Let f be an sd-strategy-proof
and unanimous rule on RN . Then, for each R 2 RN , f(R)(E(R)) = 1.
Fact 5 says that sd-strategy-proofness and ontoness imply unanimity.
Fact 5. Let f be an sd-strategy-proof and onto rule on RN . Then, it is unanimous.
Proof of Fact 5. Let y 2 Z. Let R 2 RN be such that for each i 2 N ,
p( Ri)  y. We show that f( R)(fyg) = 1. By ontoness, there is R 2 RN such that
f(R)(fyg) = 1. By sd-strategy-proofness, f( R1; R 1)(U( R1; y))  f(R)(U( R1; y)).
Since U( R1; y) = fyg and f(R)(fyg) = 1, then f( R1; R 1)(fyg) = 1. Similarly,
by sd-strategy-proofness, f( R1;2; R 1;2)(U( R2; y))  f( R1; R 1)(U( R2; y)). Since
U( R2; y) = fyg and f( R1; R 1)(fyg) = 1, f( R1;2; R 1;2)(fyg) = 1. Repeating this
argument for agents j = 3; : : : n, we have f( R)(fyg) = 1. 
Remark 4. From facts 3, 4, and 5, if a rule f on RN is sd-strategy-proof and onto,
then it is sd-ecient.
5.2. Proof of Theorem 1.
First, we prove two lemmas. Next, we prove Proposition 1. Then, we prove
Theorem 1. Let R 2 RMR. Given R 2 RN and ` 2 f1; : : : ; n(R)g, let N `(R) be
the set of agents whose peak is equal to the `-th smallest peak amount at R, that
is N `(R)  fi 2 N : p(Ri) = p`(R)g.
Lemma 1. Let f be an sd-strategy-proof and onto rule on RN . Let R 2 RN , N 
N1(R), R N 2 R N , and p; x 2 Z be such that (1-1) for each i 2 N , p( Ri) = p, (1-2)
p < x, and (1-3) p1(R) < p  p2(R). Then, f(R)([p1(R); x[) = f( R N ; R  N)([p1(R); x[).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let x0  p1(R). By condition (iii) of the minimally rich
domain in Denition 1, there exist a nite K 2 N and a sequence fR(k)0 gKk=1 of
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preferences in R such that (i) x0 P (1)0 x and x0 < p(R(1)0 ) < x, (ii) for each k 2
f2; : : : ; Kg, p(R(k 1)0 ) P (k)0 x, and p(R(k 1)0 ) < p(R(k)0 ) < x, and (iii) p(R(K 1)0 ) <
p  p(R(K)0 ). For each k 2 f2; : : : ; Kg, let xk  p(R(k)0 ).
Step 1. For each k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, each R 2 RN , each N  N1( R), and each
~R N 2 R N , if (a) p1( R) = x0, (b) for each i 2 N , ~Ri  R(k)0 , and (c) xk 1  p2( R),
then, f( R)([x0; x[) = f( ~R N ; R  N)([x0; x[).
Proof of Step 1. We prove Step 1 by induction on k. Assume that k = 1. Let
R 2 RN , N  N1( R), and ~R N 2 R N be such that (a) p1( R) = x0, (b) for each i 2
N , ~Ri  R(1)0 , and (c) x0  p2( R). Without loss of generality, let N  f1; : : : ; n1g.
First, we replace the preference Ri of agent i 2 N with the preference ~Ri, inductively.
Note that, by sd-eciency, f( R)([z; x0[) = f( ~R1; R 1)([z; x0[) = 0. Then,31
f( R)([x0; x[) = f( R)(SU( R1; x)) by sd-E
 f( ~R1; R 1)(SU( R1; x)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f( ~R1; R 1)([x0; x[) by sd-E :
Conversely,
f( ~R1; R 1)([x0; x[) = f( ~R1; R 1)(SU( ~R1; x)) by sd-E and x0 ~P1 x
 f( R)(SU( ~R1; x)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f( R)([x0; x[) by sd-E and x0 ~P1 x.
Thus, f( R)([x0; x[) = f( ~R1; R 1)([x0; x[). Since ~R1 = ~R2, by applying the same ar-
gument to the prole ( ~R1; R 1), we obtain f( ~R1; R 1)([x0; x[) = f( ~R1;2; R 1;2)([x0; x[).
Repeating this argument for agents j = 3; : : : ; n1, f( R)([x0; x[) = f( ~R N ; R  N)([x0; x[).
Thus, Step 1 holds if k = 1.
Next, we assume that k  2. Let R 2 RN , N  N1( R), and ~R N 2 R N be such
that (a) p1( R) = x0, (b) for each i 2 N , ~Ri  R(k)0 , and (c) xk 1  p2( R). Without
loss of generality, let N  f1; : : : ; nkg.
As the induction hypothesis, we assume that
A: For each R^ 2 RN , each N^  N1(R^), and each R0
N^
2 RN^ , if (A-a) p1(R^) = x0,





We show that f( R)([x0; x[) = f( ~R N ; R  N)([x0; x[). For each i 2 N1( R), let
R0i  R(k 1)0 . Then, by induction hypothesis (A),32
f( R)([x0; x[) = f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[): (1)
31Hereafter, we occasionally abbreviate sd-eciency and sd-strategy-proofness as sd-E and sd-
SP, respectively.
32Since (a) p1( R) = x0 and (c) xk 1  p2( R), all the assumptions (A-a), (A-b), and (A-c) of
induction hypothesis (A) are satised.
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Next, we replace the preferenceR0i of agent i 2 N with the preference ~Ri, inductively.
Note that, by sd-eciency and xk 1  p2( R), f(R0
N1( R)




R N1( R))([z; xk 1[) = 0. Then,
f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[)
= f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))([x
k 1; x[) by sd-E
= f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))(SU(R
0
1; x)) by sd-E
 f( ~R1; R0N1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))(SU(R01; x)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f( ~R1; R
0
N1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x
k 1; x[) by sd-E
= f( ~R1; R
0
N1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x




N1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x
0; x[)
= f( ~R1; R
0
N1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x
k 1; x[) by sd-E
= f( ~R1; R
0
N1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))(SU( ~R1; x)) by sd-E and x
k 1 ~P1 x
 f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))(SU( ~R1; x)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))([x
k 1; x[) by sd-E and xk 1 ~P1 x
= f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[) by sd-E :
Thus, f(R0
N1( R)
; R N1( R))([x0; x[) = f( ~R1; R0N1( R)nf1g;
R N1( R))([x0; x[). Since ~R1 =
~R2, by applying the same argument to the prole ( ~R1; R
0
N1( R)nf1g;




R N1( R))([x0; x[) = f( ~R1;2; R0N1( R)nf1;2g;
R N1( R))([x0; x[). Repeat-
ing this argument for agents j = 3; : : : ; nk,
f(R0N1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[) = f( ~R N ; R
0
N1( R)n N ; R N1( R))([x
0; x[): (2)
Therefore, if N = N1( R), then Step 1 follows from (1) and (2). Thus, we assume
that N 6= N1( R), that is, N1( R) n N 6= ;. Next, we consider the prole ( ~R N ; R  N).
Then, p2( ~R N ; R  N) = minfxk; p2( R)g. Thus, xk 2 < xk 1  p2( ~R N ; R  N). Note
that N1( ~R N ; R  N) = N1( R) n N 6= ;, and p1( ~R N ; R  N) = p1( R) = x0. Thus, the
assumptions of induction hypothesis (A) also hold for the prole ( ~R N ; R  N). Then,
by induction hypothesis (A),
f( ~R N ; R  N)([x
0; x[) = f( ~R N ; R
0
N1( R)n N ; R N1( R))([x
0; x[): (3)
Thus, from (1), (2), and (3),




Step 2. For each k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, each R 2 RN , each N  N1( R), each p^ 2
]xk 1; xk], and each R^ N 2 R N , if (a) p1( R) = x0, (b) for each i 2 N , p(R^i) = p^,
and (c) p^  p2( R), then, f( R)([x0; x[) = f(R^ N ; R  N)([x0; x[).
Proof of Step 2. Let k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, R 2 RN , N  N1( R), p^ 2 ]xk 1; xk], and
R^ N 2 R N be such that (a) p1( R) = x0, (b) for each i 2 N , p(R^i) = p^, and (c)
p^  p2( R). Without loss of generality, let N  f1; : : : ; nkg. If p^ = xk, then the
desired conclusion follows from Step 1. Thus, we assume that xk 1 < p^ < xk.
For each i 2 N1( R), let ~Ri  R(k)0 . Then, by Step 1,
f( R)([x0; x[) = f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[): (4)
Next, we replace the preference ~Ri of agent i 2 N with the preference R^i, inductively.
Note that, by sd-eciency and p^  p1( ~RN1( R); R N1( R)), f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([z; p^[) =
f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([z; p^[) = 0. Then,
f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[)
= f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([p^; x[) by sd-E
= f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))(SU( ~R1; x)) by sd-E and x
k 1 ~P 1 x
 f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))(SU( ~R1; x)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([p^; x[) by sd-E and x
k 1 ~P 1 x
= f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x
0; x[) by sd-E :
Conversely,
f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x
0; x[)
= f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([p^; x[) by sd-E
= f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))(SU(R^1; x)) by sd-E
 f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))(SU(R^1; x)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([p^; x[) by sd-E
= f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[) by sd-E :
Thus, f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([x0; x[) = f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x0; x[). Similarly,
applying the same argument to the prole (R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R)), we obtain
f(R^1; ~RN1( R)nf1g; R N1( R))([x0; x[) = f(R^1;2; ~RN1( R)nf1;2g; R N1( R))([x0; x[). Repeat-
ing this argument for agents j = 3; : : : ; nk, we have
f( ~RN1( R); R N1( R))([x
0; x[) = f(R^ N ; ~RN1( R)n N ; R N1( R))([x
0; x[): (5)
If N1( R) n N = ;, then Step 2 follows from (4) and (5). Thus, we assume that
N1( R)n N 6= ;. Consider the prole (R^ N ; R  N). Then, p1(R^ N ; R  N) = p1( R) = x0,
and xk 1  p^ = p2(R^ N ; R  N). It follows from Step 1 that
f(R^ N ; R  N)([x
0; x[) = f(R^ N ; ~RN1( R)n N ; R N1( R))([x
0; x[): (6)
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Thus, from (4), (5), and (6),
f( R)([x0; x[) = f(R^ N ; R  N)([x
0; x[):

Finally, we complete the proof of Lemma 1. Note that (a) p1(R) = x0, (b) for
each i 2 N , p( Ri) = p, (c) p  p2(R), and (d) xK 1 < p  xK . Then, it follows
from Step 2 that f(R)([x0; x[) = f( R N ; R  N)([x0; x[). 
Remark 5. If the strict upper contour set SU(Ri; x) is replaced by the upper
contour set U(Ri; x) in the proof of Lemma 1, then the result of Lemma 1 also holds
for the closed interval, that is, we obtain f(R)([p1(R); x]) = f( R N ; R  N)([p1(R); x]).
Remark 6. The following statements also hold by applying the argument in the
proof of Lemma 1 symmetrically. Let f be an sd-strategy-proof and onto rule on
RN . Let R 2 RN , N  N n(R), R N 2 R N , and x; p 2 Z be such that (1-1*) for
each i 2 N , p( Ri) = p, (1-2*) pn 1(R)  p < pn(R), and (1-3*) x < p. Then,
f(R)(]x; pn(R)]) = f( R N ; R  N)(]x; pn(R)]). Similarly to Remark 5, we also obtain
f(R)([x; pn(R)]) = f( R N ; R  N)([x; pn(R)]).
Lemma 2. Let f be an sd-strategy-proof and onto rule on RN . For each R 2 RN ,
each k 2 f1; : : : ; n(R)   1g, each N  Skh=1Nh(R), each R N 2 R N , and each
p; x 2 Z, if (2-1) for each i 2 N , p( Ri) = p, (2-2) pk(R) < p  pk+1(R), and (2-3)
p < x, then, f(R)([p1(R); x[) = f( R N ; R  N)([p1(R); x[).
Proof of Lemma 2. Let R 2 RN , k 2 f1; : : : ; n(R)   1g, N  Skh=1Nh(R),
R N 2 R N , and p; x 2 Z be such that (2-1) for each i 2 N , p( Ri) = p, (2-2) pk(R) <
p  pk+1(R), and (2-3) p < x. Without loss of generality, let N  f1; : : : ; j N jg.33
Let x0  p1(R). We prove Lemma 2 by induction on k. Let k = 1. Then, the
desired conclusion follows from Lemma 1. Thus, we assume that k  2. As the
induction hypothesis, we assume that
B: For each ~R 2 RN , each k^ 2 f1; : : : ; k   1g, each N 0  Sk^h=1Nh( ~R), each
R^N 0 2 RN 0, and each p^; x^ 2 Z, if (2-1b) for each i 2 N 0, p(R^i) = p^, (2-2b) pk^( ~R) <
p^  pk^+1( ~R), and (2-3b) p^ < x^, then, f( ~R)([p1( ~R); x^[) = f(R^N 0 ; ~R N 0)([p1( ~R); x^[).
Let Nk 1  Sk 1h=1Nh(R). Let R(k)Nk 1 2 R Nk 1 be such that for each i 2 Nk 1,
p(R
(k)
i )  pk(R). Then, by induction hypothesis (B),
f(R)([x0; x[) = f(R
(k)
Nk 1 ; R  Nk 1)([x
0; x[): (7)
Let Nk  Skh=1Nh(R). Let (N^ ; ~N) be a partition of N such that N^ [ ~N = N ,
N^ \ ~N = ;, N^  Nk 1, and ~N  Nk(R). Note that for each i 2 N , i 2 Nk(R) or
i 2 Nk 1.
Let R0  (R(k)Nk 1 ; R  Nk 1). Next, we replace the preference R0i of agent i 2 N
33jAj denotes the cardinality of the set A.
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with the preference Ri, inductively. Then, by p
1(R0) = pk(R) and N  N1(R0),
f(R0)([x0; x[) = f(R0)([pk(R); x[) by sd-E
= f( R N ; R
0
  N)([p
k(R); x[) by Lemma 1
= f( R N ; R
0
  N)([x
0; x[) by sd-E :
Since R0  (R(k)Nk 1 ; R  Nk 1),
f(R
(k)
Nk 1 ; R  Nk 1)([x
0; x[) = f( R N ; R
(k)
Nk 1nN^ ; RNk(R)n ~N ; R  Nk)([x
0; x[): (8)
If Nk 1 n N^ = ;, then Lemma 2 follows from (7) and (8). Thus, we assume that
Nk 1 n N^ 6= ;.
Next, consider the prole ( R N ; R  N). Note that pk(R)  pk( R N ; R  N). Then,
by induction hypothesis (B),34
f( R N ; R  N)([x
0; x[) = f( R N ; R
(k)
Nk 1nN^ ; RNk(R)n ~N ; R  Nk)([x
0; x[): (9)
Thus, from (7), (8), and (9),
f(R)([p1(R); x[) = f( R N ; R  N)([p
1(R); x[):

Remark 7. If the result of Remark 5 is applied to the proof of Lemma 2 instead
of Lemma 1, the result of Lemma 2 also holds for the closed interval, that is, we
obtain f(R)([p1(R); x]) = f( R N ; R  N)([p1(R); x]).
Remark 8. The following statements also hold by applying the argument in the
proof of Lemma 2 symmetrically. Let f be an sd-strategy-proof and onto rule on RN .
For each R 2 RN , each k 2 f2; : : : ; n(R)g, each N  Sn(R)h=k Nh(R), each R N 2 R N ,
and each x; p 2 Z, if (2-1*) for each i 2 N , p( Ri) = p, (2-2*) pk 1(R)  p < pk(R),
and (2-3*) x < p, then, f(R)(]x; pn(R)]) = f( R N ; R  N)(]x; pn(R)]). Similarly to
Remark 7, we also obtain f(R)([x; pn(R)]) = f( R N ; R  N)([x; pn(R)]).
Proof of Proposition 1. Let R 2 RN , i 2 N , and R^i 2 R. Let [x; y[  Z be such
that [x; y[ \ E(Ri; R^i) = ;. We show that f(R)([x; y[) = f(R^i; R i)([x; y[).35 If
p(Ri) = p(R^i), then, by condition (ii) of the minimally rich domain in Denition 1,
Ri = R^i. Thus, we consider the case where p(Ri) 6= p(R^i). Assume that p(Ri) <
p(R^i). The opposite case can be treated symmetrically.
Case 1. p(R^i) < x.
If p(R^i)  pn(R)(R), then, by sd-eciency, f(R)([x; y[) = 0 = f(R^i; R i)([x; y[).
Thus, assume that p(R^i) < p
n(R)(R). Then, there is k 2 f1; : : : ; n(R) 1g such that
pk(R) < p(R^i)  pk+1(R). Since p(Ri) < p(R^i), i 2
Sk
h=1N
h(R). Then, it follows
34By letting ~R  ( R N ; R  N ), N 0  Nk 1nN^ , p^  pk(R), and x^  x, all the assumptions (2-1b),
(2-2b), and (2-3b) of induction hypothesis (B) are satised.
35To show the equivalence of two distributions g and h over Z, it is sucient to prove that for
each [x; y[  Z, g([x; y[) = h([x; y[). See Ehlers et al. (2002, Remark A.3. in the Appendix).
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from Lemma 2 that f(R)([p1(R); x[) = f(R^i; R i)([p1(R); x[). Similarly, by x < y,
f(R)([p1(R); y[) = f(R^i; R i)([p1(R); y[). Thus,
f(R)([x; y[) = f(R)([p1(R); y[)  f(R)([p1(R); x[)
= f(R^i; R i)([p1(R); y[)  f(R^i; R i)([p1(R); x[)
= f(R^i; R i)([x; y[):
Case 2. y  p(Ri).
If p(Ri) = p
1(R), then, by sd-eciency, f(R)([x; y[) = 0 = f(R^i; R i)([x; y[).
Thus, assume that p1(R) < p(Ri). Consider the prole R^  (R^i; R i). Then, there
is k 2 f2; : : : ; n(R^)g such that pk 1(R^)  p(Ri) < pk(R^). Since p(Ri) < p(R^i),
i 2 Sn(R^)
h=k
Nh(R^). Let p^  pn(R^)(R^). First, we assume that y < p(Ri). Then, it
follows from Remark 8 that f(R)([y; p^]) = f(R^i; R i)([y; p^]). Similarly, by x < y,
f(R)([x; p^]) = f(R^i; R i)([x; p^]). Thus, f(R)([x; y[) = f(R^i; R i)([x; y[). Next, we
assume that y = p(Ri). Let fykgk2N be a sequence in Z such that for each k 2 N,
yk < y, [x; yk[  [x; yk+1[ , and
S
k2N[x; yk[ = [x; y[ .
36 Then, for each k 2 N,
yk < p(Ri). Thus, by applying the above argument again, for each k 2 N, we have
f(R)([x; yk[) = f(R^i; R i)([x; yk[). Since distributions are continuous from below,37
f(R)([x; y[) = f(R^i; R i)([x; y[). 
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to show that each probabilistic generalized median
rule is sd-strategy-proof and onto. The proof of the uniqueness part of Theorem 1
is similar to that of Ehlers et al. (2002), but we provide it for completeness. Let f
be an sd-strategy-proof and onto rule dened on RN .
Step 1. Construction of a collection (DS)S22N of probability distributions.
For each i 2 N , let Rzi ; Rzi 2 R be such that p(Rzi )  z and p(Rzi )  z. For each
S 2 2N , let DS  f(RzS; Rz S).
Step 2. The collection D  (DS)S22N satises the following properties:
(i) D;(fzg) = 1, (ii) DN(fzg) = 1, and (iii) for each S; T 2 2N and each x 2 Z,
DS[T ([z; x]) DS([z; x[)  0.
By unanimity, (i)D;(fzg)  f(RzN)(fzg) = 1, and (ii)DN(fzg)  f(RzN)(fzg) =
1. We show property (iii) of Step 2. Let S; T 2 2N and x 2 Z. Without loss of
generality, assume that S \ T 6= ; and T  f1; 2; : : : ; t^g. Then,
DS[f1g([z; x])  f(RzS; Rz1; Rz (S[f1g))([z; x])













36For each k 2 N, set yk  y   y x2k . Then, the sequence fykgk2N satises these properties.
37A probability distribution g is continuous from below if for each sequence fAkgk2N such that
for each k 2 N, Ak  Ak+1 and
S
k2NAk = A, g(A) = limk!1 g(Ak). See Ehlers et al. (2002,
Theorem A.1. in the Appendix).
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Repeating this argument for agents j = 2; : : : ; t^, we getDS[T ([z; x]) DS([z; x[)  0.
Step 3. For each R 2 RN , f(R) = gmD(R).38
Let R 2 RN . By sd-eciency, f(R)([z; p1(R)[) = 0 = D;([z; p1(R)[), and
f(R)(]pn(R); z]) = 0 = DN(]p
n(R); z]). Let ` 2 f1; : : : ; n(R)  1g.
First, we show that f(R)(]p`(R); p`+1(R)[) = gmD(R)(]p`(R); p`+1(R)[). By un-
compromisingness,
f(R)(]p`(R); p`+1(R)[) = f(RzS` ; R
z
 S`)(]p
`(R); p`+1(R)[)  DS`(]p`(R); p`+1(R)[):
Let ` 2 f1; : : : ; n(R)g. Next, we show that f(R)(fp`(R)g) = gmD(R)(fp`(R)g).
First,
f(R)(]p`(R); z]) = f(RzS` ; R S`)(]p
`(R); z]) by uncompromisingness
= 1  f(RzS` ; R S`)([z; p`(R)])
= 1  f(RzS` ; Rz S`)([z; p`(R)]) by uncompromisingness









= 1  f(RS` 1 ; Rz S` 1)([p`(R); z])
= 1  f(RzS` 1 ; Rz S` 1)([p`(R); z]) by uncompromisingness





f(R)(fp`(R)g) = 1  f(R)(]p`(R); z])  f(R)([z; p`(R)[)






= f(RzS` ; R
z
 S`)([z; p
`(R)])  f(RzS` 1 ; Rz S` 1)([z; p`(R)[)
 DS`([z; p`(R)]) DS` 1([z; p`(R)[):

5.3. Proof of Theorem 2.
Next, we prove Theorem 2. The proof structure is similar to that of Berga and
Serizawa (2000), and we borrow some of their techniques. However, the class of
probabilistic rules is much larger than that of deterministic rules, and the notion
of sd-strategy-proofness is dierent from strategy-proofness for deterministic rules.
38Recall that the distribution of gmD is equal to the distribution D; on the interval [z; p1(R)[,
DN on the interval ]p
n(R); z], and for each ` 2 f1; : : : ; n 1g, DS` on the interval ]p`(R); p`+1(R)[.
Further, for each ` 2 f1; : : : ; ng, the probability assigned to the `-th peak, gmD(R)(fp`(R)g), is
equal to DS`([z; p
`(R)]) DS` 1([z; p`(R)[).
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Furthermore, in the proof of Theorem 2, we use our characterization result of sd-
strategy-proof and onto rules on a minimally rich domain (Theorem 1). Thus, we
cannot directly apply their proofs.
Lemma 3 (Berga and Serizawa, 2000, Lemma 3). Let g be a continuous real-
valued function dened on Z such that for some x; y; z 2 Z, x < y < z, g(x) > g(y)
and g(z) > g(y). Then,
(a) there exists a triple a; b; r 2 Z, and for any " > 0, there exists c such that
c 2 ]r; r + "[ which satisfy the following four conditions: (i) x  a < b < r < c  z,
(ii) g(a) = g(r), (iii) if x0 2 ]a; r[ , g(a) > g(x0), and (iv) if x0 2 [a; c[ , g(c) > g(x0),
and
(b) there exists a triple r0; b0; c0 2 Z, and for any " > 0, there exists a0 such that
a0 2 ]r0   "; r0[ which satisfy the following four conditions: (i) x  a0 < r0 < b0 <
c0  z, (ii) g(r0) = g(c0), (iii) if x0 2 ]r0; c0[ , g(c0) > g(x0), and (iv) if x0 2 ]a0; c0],
g(a0) > g(x0).
Let R 2 RMR. Let R  P be a domain that includes R.
Lemma 4. Let f be a rule on RN satisfying sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and
the no-vetoer condition. Let z; z0 2 Z with z  z0, i 2 N , R0i 2 R, and R i 2
RNnfig be such that for each j 2 N n fig, either p(Rj) = z or p(Rj) = z0. Then,
f(R0i ; R i)([z; z
0]) = 1.
Proof of Lemma 4. By contradiction, suppose that f(R0i ; R i)([z; z
0]) < 1. With-
out loss of generality, assume that f(R0i ; R i)([z; z[) > 0. Let R
z
i 2 R be such that
p(Rzi )  z. Then,





 f(R0i ; R i)(SU(Rzi ; z)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
= f(R0i ; R i)([z; z[)
> 0:
For each j 2 N n fig, let Rzj 2 R be such that p(Rzj )  z. By Proposition 1, any sd-
strategy-proof and onto probabilistic rule f dened on RN is uncompromising, and
so, f(Rzi ; R
z
 i)([z; z[) = f(R
z




 i)(fzg) 6= 1, which
contradicts the no-vetoer condition. 
Lemma 5. Let f be an sd-strategy-proof rule on RN . Let a; b 2 Z with a 6= b and
X  [a; b[; [a; b]; ]b; a], or [b; a]. Let Ra0 2 R be such that p(Ra0) = a. Let N  N ,
R0N 2 R
N , and RaN 2 R
N be such that for each i 2 N , Rai = Ra0. Let R  N 2 RNn N .
Assume that f(R0N ; R  N)(X) > 0. Then,
(a) if X = [a; b[ or ]b; a], then f(RaN ; R  N)(SU(R
a
0; b)) > 0, and
(b) if X = [a; b] or [b; a], then f(RaN ; R  N)(U(R
a
0; b)) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. We prove (a) of Lemma 5. Let X  [a; b[ . (The same argu-
ment applies to the other case.) Without loss of generality, let N  f1; 2; : : : ; j N jg.
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1; b))  f(R0N ; R  N)(SU(Ra1; b)) by sd-SP and Fact 2
 f(R0N ; R  N)([a; b[) by [a; b[  SU(Ra0; b)
> 0:





















Repeating this argument for agents j = 3; : : : ; j N j, f(RaN ; R  N)(SU(Ra0; b)) > 0.
By replacing the strict upper contour set SU(Ra0; b) by the upper contour set
U(Ra0; b) in the proof of (a), we can also prove (b) of Lemma 5. 
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we show condition (i) in the denition of maximal
domain.39 For each R 2 (Rvex)N and each i 2 N , dene p^(Ri)  minfx : x 2
p(Ri)g. Let D  (DS)S22N be a collection of probability distributions such that for
each S1 2 2N with jS1j  1, DS1(fzg) = 1, and for each Sn 1 2 2N with jSn 1j 
n   1, DSn 1(fzg) = 1, and for each S; T 2 2N , and each x 2 Z, DS[T ([z; x])  
DS([z; x[)  0. For each R 2 (Rvex)N , dene f(R)  gmD((p^(Ri))i2N) . Then, the
rule f satises sd-strategy-proofness, ontoness, and the no-vetoer condition.
Next, we show condition (ii) in the denition of maximal domain. Let R  P be
such that R  R. Assume that there is a rule f on R satisfying the three axioms
in Theorem 2. Let f jR be the restriction of f to RN . Then, by Theorem 1, there is
D 2  such that for each R 2 RN , f jR(R) = gmD(p(R)). We show that R  Rvex.
By contradiction, suppose that there is a non-convex preference R0 2 R n Rvex.
Then, by non-convexity of R0, there is a triple x; y; z 2 Z such that x < y < z and
x P 0 y and z P 0 y.
We introduce some notations. Let Z(R0) be the set of triples (a; b; r) 2 Z3 such
that a I0 r, a P 0 b, z0  minfa; rg < b < maxfa; rg  z0, and for each x0 2 ]z0; z0[,
a P 0 x0.
Let (a; r) 2 Z2 with a 6= r. Dene R(a; r)  f R 2 R : r P a; and minfa; rg <
p( R) < maxfa; rgg. Note that, by condition (iii-a) of the minimally rich domain in
Denition 1, for each pair (a0; r0) 2 Z2 with a0 6= r0, R(a0; r0) 6= ;.
Let R 2 R(a; r). Let E( R; a)  fe 2 Z : e I a; and e 6= ag. Let e( R; a) 2 Z
be such that (i) if E( R; a) 6= ;, then e( R; a) 2 E( R; a),40 (ii) if E( R; a) = ; and
a < p( R), then e( R; a) = z, and (iii) if E( R; a) = ; and p( R) < a, then e( R; a) = z.
Let C(R0; a)  fc 2 Z : for each x^ 2 [minfa; cg;maxfa; cg] with x^ 6= c; c P 0
x^g, and C(R0; (a; r); R)  fc 2 Z : c 2 C(R0; a) and minfr; e( R; a)g < c <
maxfr; e( R; a)gg.
39Since any deterministic rule is included in the class of probabilistic rules as a special case,
condition (i) also follows from the result of Berga and Serizawa (2000).
40Note that if E( R; a) 6= ;, then E( R; a) is a singleton.
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Given x 2 Z, we denote by R(x) 2 R the preference relation whose peak p(R(x))
is equal to the alternative x.
Claim 1. For each k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, each (a; b; r) 2 Z(R0), each R 2 R(a; r), each
c 2 C(R0; (a; r); R), and each N 0  N with jN 0j = k, f(R(c)N 0 ; R(a) N 0)(fcg) = 0.
Proof of Claim 1. Let k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng, (a; b; r) 2 Z(R0), R 2 R(a; r), c 2
C(R0; (a; r); R), and N 0  N with jN 0j = k. Without loss of generality, assume
that a < r < c. Let k = 1. Then, the desired conclusion follows from Lemma 4.
Assume that k  2. We prove Claim 1 by induction on k. Let k = 2. Without loss of






By Lemma 4, f(R
(a)
1 ; R2; R
(a)





1; a))  f(R(a)1 ; R2; R(a) 1;2)(U(R01; a)) by sd-SP
 f(R(a)1 ; R2; R(a) 1;2)(fag) by fag  U(R01; a)
= 1:
Also, by Lemma 4, f(R01; R2; R
(a)
 1;2)([a; p( R2)]) = 1. Since ]a; r[ * U(R01; a), we
have f(R01; R2; R
(a)












1; c))  f(R(c)1 ; R(c)2 ; R(a) 1;2)(U(R01; c)) by sd-SP
 f(R(c)1 ; R(c)2 ; R(a) 1;2)(fcg) by fcg  U(R01; c)
> 0:



















 1;2)(U( R2; c)), which contra-
dicts sd-strategy-proofness. Thus, Claim 1 holds if k = 2.
Let k  3. As the induction hypothesis, we assume that
C: For each k0 2 f1; 2; : : : ; k 1g, each (a0; b0; r0) 2 Z(R0), each R0 2 R(a0; r0), each





We show that f(R
(c)
N 0 ; R
(a)
 N 0)(fcg) = 0: By contradiction, suppose that
f(R
(c)
N 0 ; R
(a)
 N 0)(fcg) > 0: (10)
Let j 2 N 0. Without loss of generality, let j  1. We establish two steps to derive
a contradiction.
Step 1 of Claim 1. For each h 2 f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g, and each Nh  N 0 n f1g such
that jNhj = h, f( R1; R0Nh ; R
(a)
 (f1g[Nh))(fag) = 1.




Next, let h 2 f1; : : : ; k  1g and Nh  N 0 n f1g be such that jNhj = h. Without
loss of generality, let Nh  f2; 3; : : : ; h+1g. As the induction hypothesis, we assume
that
D: For each N  N 0 n f1g with j N j = h  1, f( R1; R0N ; R(a) (f1g[ N))(fag) = 1.
Let i 2 Nh and N  Nh n fig. Without loss of generality, let i  2. Let R^ Nh 
( R1; R
(a)





; R^ Nh)(fag) < 1. There
are three cases.
Case 1. f(R02; R
0
N
; R^ Nh)(]a; r[) > 0.










2; a))  f(R(a)2 ; R0N ; R^ Nh)(U(R02; a)) by sd-SP




; R^ Nh)(]a; r[) = 0, which is a contradiction.
Case 2. f(R02; R
0
N
; R^ Nh)([r; z]) > 0.
By Lemma 3,41 there is (a0; b0; r0) 2 Z(R0), and for each " > 0, there is c0 2
]r0; r0 + "[ such that a  a0 < b0 < r0 < c0  r, and for each x0 2 [a0; c0[, c0 P 0 x0. Let














(z); r)) > 0.
Thus, by [r; z] = U(R(z); r), f(R
(z)
Nh
; R^ Nh)([r; z]) > 0. Since f jR is uncompromising,






 Nh)([r; z]) = f(R
(z)
Nh
; R^ Nh)([r; z]) > 0:
By [r; z]  [c0; z], f(R(z)Nh ; R
(a0)
 Nh)([c
0; z]) > 0.



















which is a contradiction.
Case 3. f(R02; R
0
N
; R^ Nh)([z; a[) > 0.
By Lemma 3, there is (a0; b0; r0) 2 Z(R0), and for each " > 0, there is c0 2
]r0   "; r0[ such that a  c0 < r0 < b0 < a0  r, and for each x0 2 ]c0; a0], c0 P 0 x0. Let
41Note that, since each preference relation R0 in P is continuous, there is a continuous function
g on Z that represents R0.
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(z); a)) > 0.
By [z; a[ = SU(R(z); a), f(R
(z)
Nh
; R^ Nh)([z; a[) > 0. Since f jR is uncompromising, by







 Nh)([z; a[) = f(R
(z)
Nh
; R^ Nh)([z; a[) > 0:






 Nh)([z; a[) = DNh([z; a[)
 DNh([z; c0])
= DNh([z; c








which is a contradiction.




; R^ Nh)(fag) = 1. Thus, Step 1 of Claim 1 holds. 
Step 2 of Claim 1. For each h 2 f0; 1; : : : ; k   1g, and each Nh  N 0 n f1g such




 N 0)(fcg) > 0.
We show Step 2 by induction on h. If h = 0, the desired conclusion follows from
the inequality (10).
Next, let h 2 f1; : : : ; k  1g and Nh  N 0 n f1g be such that jNhj = h. Without
loss of generality, let Nh  f2; 3; : : : ; h+1g. As the induction hypothesis, we assume
that
E: For each N  N 0nf1g with j N j = h 1, f(R(c)1 ; R0N ; R(c)N 0n(f1g[ N); R
(a)
 N 0)(fcg) > 0.
Let i 2 Nh and N  Nh n fig. Without loss of generality, let i  2. Let
~R Nh  (R(c)1 ; R(c)N 0n(f1;2g[ N); R
(a)





; ~R Nh)(fcg) > 0. First,











2; c))  f(R(c)2 ; R0N ; ~R Nh)(U(R02; c)) by sd-SP








; ~R Nh)(fcg) = 0. There are two cases.
Case 1. f(R02; R
0
N
; ~R Nh)(]c; z]) > 0.




(z); c)) > 0. Thus, f(R
(z)
Nh
; ~R Nh)(]c; z]) > 0.
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 Nh)(fcg) = 0. Since f jR =




; ~R Nh)(]c; z]) = D Nh(]c; z])
 D Nh([c; z])
= 1 D Nh([z; c[)








which is a contradiction.
Case 2. f(R02; R
0
N
; ~R Nh)([z; a[) > 0.
By Lemma 3, there is (a0; b0; r0) 2 Z(R0), and for each " > 0, there is c0 2
]r0   "; r0[ such that a  c0 < r0 < b0 < a0  r, and for each x0 2 ]c0; a0], c0 P 0 x0. Let
























 Nh)([z; a[) = f(R
(z)
Nh
; ~R Nh)([z; a[) > 0:






 Nh)([z; a[) = DNh([z; a[)
 DNh([z; c0])
= DNh([z; c








which is a contradiction.




; ~R Nh)(fcg) > 0, and so, Step 2 of Claim 1 holds. 





 N 0)(fag) = 1. Since c P1 a, f( R1; R0N 0nf1g; R(a) N 0)(U( R1; c)) = 0.











 N 0))(U( R1; c));
which contradicts sd-strategy-proofness. 
Finally, we complete the proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 3, there is (a; b; r) 2
Z(R0), and for each " > 0, there is c 2 ]r; r + "[ such that x  a < b < r < c  z,
and for each x0 2 [a; c[, c P 0 x0. Let Rd 2 R(a; r) and c 2 C(R0; (a; r); Rd). Then,
by Claim 1 for N 0  N , f(R(c)N )(fcg) = 0. However, since f jR = gmD and gmD is
unanimous, f(R
(c)
N )(fcg) = 1, which is a contradiction. 
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